Lancaster Bomber Service Manual
XIVA computor, normally mounted on the left side of the forward fuselage. The wind speed and direction are set on the blue dials, the bomb's terminal velocity and the target altitude on the green dials. The Mark XIV Computing Bomb Sight was a developed by (RAF) during the. The bombsight was also known as the Blackett sight after its primary inventor,. Production of a slightly modified version was also undertaken in the as the Sperry T-1, which was interchangeable with UK-built version.
The Avro Lancaster is a. The final Lancaster in service with Bomber. One difference between the two engine versions was that the VI had manual. The legendary Avro Lancaster receives the famous Haynes Manual treatment with the full co-operation and authorisation of the Royal Air Force. Here is a unique perspective on what it takes to restore and operate a Lancaster, as well as a wonderful insight into the engineering and construction of this remarkable aeroplane. Avro Lancaster pagesAM 16:29 Page 1. LANCASTER BOMBER POCKET MANUAL COMPILED AND INTRODUCED BY MARTIN ROBSON.
It was the RAF's standard bombsight for the second half of the War. Developed starting in 1939, the Mk. 2018 Seadoo Bombardier Gtx Operators Manual.
XIV began replacing the -era in 1942. XIV was essentially an automated version of the Course Setting sight, using a to update the sights in real-time as conditions changed. XIV required only 10 seconds of straight flight before the drop and automatically accounted for shallow climbs and dives. More importantly, the Mk.
XIV sighting unit was much smaller than the Course Setting sight, which allowed it to contain a. This kept the sight pointed at the target even as the bomber manoeuvred, dramatically increasing its accuracy and ease of sighting.
XIV was theoretically less accurate than the contemporary but was smaller, easier to use, faster-acting and better suited to night bombing. In practice, it demonstrated accuracy roughly equal to the Norden's. It equipped the majority of the RAF bomber fleet during the second half of the war; small numbers of the and were used in specialist roles.
The Low Level Bombsight was built using parts of the Mark XIV, stabilized in pitch rather than roll. A post-war upgrade, the T-4, also known by its Blue Devil, connected directly to the computers to automate the setting of and direction.
This eliminated the one potential inaccuracy in the system, further increased accuracy, and simplified operation. These equipped the force as well as other aircraft until their retirement from service in the 1960s. Contents • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • History [ ] Course-setting sights [ ] A problem with early bombsights was that they could only correct for the effects of the wind in a simple way and required the bomber to fly directly up- or down-wind from the target, to minimise the complexity of the required calculations. This made it difficult to attack moving targets and allowed to sight their weapons along the wind line. In 1917 introduced the (CSBS), which replaced the tables and timings used in earlier sights with a simple mechanical calculator capable of solving the sideways drift due to the wind.
As the bomb aimer turned a wind direction knob, the main portion of the sight was pushed to the left or right, indicating the required angle to fly to take the aircraft over the target. The CSBS was the first bombsight that allowed the bomber to approach the target from any direction, which offered greatly increased tactical freedom. The downside to the CSBS was that the settings, made through four main input dials, were useful for one operational setup, a given altitude and heading. If the aircraft manoeuvred, the entire system had to be reset. Additionally, the system required the bomber's direction to be compared to objects on the ground, requiring a time-consuming process sighting through thin metal wires against a suitable object on the ground below.
As the sight was not stabilized, any manoeuvres to correct for misalignment interfered with the ability to measure the heading, so these corrections further extended the bomb run. The CSBS generally required the bomber to fly straight and level for a lengthy time. Although the need for an improved CSBS was known in the 1930s, little work on developing such a sight was carried out. That was because an entirely new class of tachometric bombsights were being developed, which offered dramatically improved accuracy and automated much of the setup. The RAF was working on such a design, the Automatic Bomb Sight, but development was slow and it had not been accepted for use when the war started. Learning of a similar design developed by the, the began extensive negotiations in an effort to gain a production licence for this.
The US Navy constantly refused these requests, deeming it too sensitive to risk losing over Germany, and their refusals ultimately led to significant political friction between the two nations. As the war started, revised versions of the CSBS, the Mk.
IX, remained universal, and the Mk. X, a more extensive improvement, was in mass production and being readied for service entry. A pressing need [ ]. The CSBS required the aircraft to remain level while the bomb aimer watched the drift along the thin parallel wires (white). On 28 March 1939, the head of Air Chief Marshal Sir hosted a conference on the state of Bomber Command.
Among the many problems with operational readiness, he noted that RAF bombs were much too small and that bombsight technology was obsolete. Given the problems of obtaining a modern bombsight, he pressed for the creation of a high-speed bomber design that could safely attack at low levels. On 18 December 1939, bombers carried out a raid on German shipping in what became known as the. Detected on and engaged en route to their targets, over half the attacking force was destroyed or damaged beyond repair.
Ludlow-Hewitt presented a report on the attack on 22 December 1939, noting that flying straight and level for the CSBS made the bombers easy targets for fighters and anti-aircraft gunners. He again pressed for a new bombsight that featured stabilization to allow the aircraft to manoeuvre while it approached the target. The CSBS and the improved version, the Mk. X, were insufficient, as both were too large to easily stabilize.
Because of the way it was built, the Automatic Bomb Sight could be equipped with a stabilizer but it was estimated that it would be some time before it could be modified and brought into production. The Norden did offer stabilization but it also required relatively long setup times and was still not available for purchase. Another solution to the vulnerability of the RAF bombers was to fly at night, which was taken up as the primary tactic of Bomber Command. X proved to be very difficult to read at night and bombers that carried it were quickly refitted with the earlier Mk. The Norden was unable to work at night at all; the bomb aimer had to locate the target long in advance of the drop point using a built-in telescope and targets were simply not visible at the required distances in low light. What was needed was a new bombsight, one that could be very quickly set up, had useful illumination of the crosshairs for night use, and was stabilized so the bomb aimer could watch the approach as the bomber was manoeuvring. An early attempt was the Mk.
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